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The inﬂuence of non-governing law on the interpretation of
contracts in the United States
Pieter Wolters*
In a globalized world, the parties and the contract are often “connected” to a
law or jurisdiction that is different from the forum. In the current literature, the
question of whether this law should inﬂuence the interpretation of such a
contract has been approached from a conﬂict of laws perspective. However,
this approach does not explain the inﬂuence of the “non-governing” law
when this law is not applied. After all, the conﬂict of laws rule might lead
to the application of another law. This paper shows that the non-governing
law can inﬂuence the interpretation of a contract. Non-governing law can
be connected to the contract, or to the parties to the contract, in various
ways. In these situations, a court can consider non-governing law to better
vindicate the intention of the parties. Furthermore, non-governing law can
also inﬂuence the interpretation “through” other circumstances. Moreover,
the inﬂuence of non-governing law is not signiﬁcantly different from the
inﬂuence of several more established circumstances. The inﬂuence of non-
governing law on the interpretation of a contract is limited to situations
wherein the relevant conﬂict of laws rules do not lead to the application of
the connected non-governing law. However, within this scope, the ability to
consider non-governing law is a useful tool that is superior to the “conﬂicts
of law approach”.
Keywords: contracts; interpretation of contracts; intention; non-governing
law; Islamic law; Jewish law; Restatement (Second) of Conﬂict of Laws;
Restatement (Second) of Contracts
A. Introduction
In the various jurisdictions of the United States, the interpretation of a contract
depends on the circumstances of the case.1 Some sources even state that all the
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1See, eg,Myers v Gulf Coast Minerals Mgmt Corp, 361 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tex. 1962); Ran-
dallstown Plaza Associates v United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 703, 709 (1987);Watkins v Ford, 304
P.3d 841, 847 (Utah 2013); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(1); JE Murray,
Murray on Contracts (Michie, 4th edn, 2001) 479–480; SJ Burton, Elements of Contract
Interpretation (Oxford University Press, 2009) 5.
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circumstances can be relevant.2 However, this inﬂuence of all (relevant) circum-
stances is not reﬂected in the current literature on the interpretation of contracts.
Generally, the literature only analyses the role of certain circumstances.3 A
thorough or systematic analysis of all the circumstances that inﬂuence the
interpretation of a contract is lacking.
This paper explores the relevance of a circumstance that has been overlooked
in the current literature on contract interpretation. In a globalized world, the parties
or the contract are often “connected” to a law or jurisdiction that is different from
the forum. The question of whether this law should inﬂuence the interpretation of
such a contract can be approached from a conﬂict of laws perspective.4 The forum
can apply the connected law when interpreting the contract. However, this
approach does not explain the inﬂuence of the connected law when this law is
not applied. The conﬂict rule might lead to the application of another law. After
all, even if the contract has some connections with a particular legal system, the
connections with another law might be stronger. This paper explores the inﬂuence
of “non-governing law” on the interpretation of contracts. It will answer the fol-
lowing question: “can non-governing law inﬂuence the interpretation of
contracts?”
Before answering this question, it is important to establish various deﬁnitions.
Law is “non-governing”5 if it is different from the law that is applicable under the
relevant conﬂict of laws rules. It is non-governing if it is from a state or country
whose law does not govern (the interpretation of) the contract. To clarify, the
forum and the parties do not determine whether a law is “non-governing”. It is
solely decided by the applicable conﬂict of laws rules. In other words, law is
“non-governing” if it is different from the lex causae, even if it is the lex fori.
For example, if a contract is governed by the law of Michigan, the law of
2See, eg, Krimlofski v United States, 190 F. Supp. 734, 741 (N.D. Iowa 1961); Steckler v
Continental Oil Co, 154 So. 2d 647, 651–52 (La. Ct. App. 1963); Paciﬁc Gas & Elec
Co v GW Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co, 69 Cal. 2d 33, 39 (1968); Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 202(1); Murray, supra n 1; 5 MN Knifﬁn, Corbin on Contracts
(Vol 5, Joseph M Perillo (ed), Lexis, 1998) 64.
3See, eg, Knifﬁn, supra n 2, § 24.10, § 24.13, § 24.16–17, § 24.20–21; Burton, supra n 1, at
37–57. Various circumstances are mentioned and analyzed in sections D and F.
4See, eg, Restatement (Second) of Conﬂict of Laws § 188(1) (the “most signiﬁcant relation-
ship” test); Michael H Hoffheimer, “Conﬂicting Rules of Interpretation and Construction in
Multi-Jurisdictional Disputes”, (2011) Rutgers Law Review599.
5The term “foreign law” is also used. Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v Beximco Pharmaceu-
ticals Ltd (No1) [2004] 1 WLR 1784, 1799; U Magnus, “The Germanic Tradition: Appli-
cation of Boilerplate Clauses under German Law”, in G Cordero-Moss (ed) Boilerplate
Clauses, International Commercial Contracts and the Applicable Law (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2011) 179, 190; IS Zykin, “The East European Tradition: Application of Boiler-
plate Clauses under Russian Law” in Cordero-Moss (ed), ibid, 329, 331. This term is
appropriate in most of the situations that are discussed in this paper. However, it can be con-
fusing if the lex causae is different from the lex fori. In that context, the lex causae could be
considered “foreign”, even though it is not “non-governing”.
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New York is non-governing even if the parties to the contract and the court that is
resolving the dispute are located in New York.
Conﬂict of laws rules may prevent a rule from becoming a relevant “non-gov-
erning” law. In many cases, the connected law will also be the applicable law, even
if it is different from the law of the forum. For this reason, non-governing law will
only inﬂuence the interpretation of contracts in extraordinary situations. It will
only inﬂuence the interpretation if it is relevant but not applicable.
This paper only discusses law that is “horizontal”. The law is “horizontal” if it
is not superior or inferior to the governing law. Federal law and treaties fall outside
the scope of this research, even if they are not directly applicable. “Law” refers to
law as evidenced by statutes and regulations, but also to law that is evidenced by
court decisions. Unwritten norms, such as cultural rules, usages or business prac-
tices, may be law if they are binding under the non-governing law.
Although this paper is about the interpretation of contracts in the various jur-
isdictions of the United States, it does discuss several cases from other countries.
These cases provide additional examples of the inﬂuence of non-governing law.
They show that non-governing law can inﬂuence the interpretation of a contract
in a variety of situations. In each of these cases, the connected law affects
the interpretation in a way that is similar to the interpretation of a contract in
the United States. It inﬂuences the interpretation if it affects the intention of the
parties.6
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. First, section B sketches two situ-
ations that will function as examples throughout the rest of the paper. Next, the
paper explores the relationship between the interpretation of contracts and conﬂict
of laws rules. It shows that considering non-governing law when interpreting the
contract has independent value, even if conﬂict of laws rules could lead to the
same result (section C). Section D gives a short overview of the interpretation
of contracts in the United States. Courts give effect to the intention of the
parties. Non-governing law can inﬂuence this intention in various situations
(section E5). Section F analyses the relationship between non-governing law
and circumstances that are discussed in the current literature on the interpretation
of contracts. The paper ends with a conclusion (section G7).
B. Two situations
This section sketches two situations that will function as examples throughout the
rest of the paper. These situations represent two distinct types of connections to the
non-governing law. In the ﬁrst case, the parties are connected to the non-govern-
ing law (section B1). In the second situation, the contract is connected (section
6About German law, see G Dannemann, “Common Law-Based Contracts under German
Law”, in Cordero-Moss (ed) supra n 5, 62, 69; Magnus, supra n 5, at 190 n 86. About
Dutch law, see sections E1 and E2(d).
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B2). Finally, section B3 shows that it is also possible to imagine situations in
which non-governing law could play a more subtle role.
1. The non-governing law is connected to the parties – the Chinese cook7
Shu and Lam are born in China but currently reside in State X. The parties come to
an oral agreement: Shu will work as a cook in the restaurant “Lotus”. About four
times each week, Lam visits the restaurant and gives instructions. Every month,
Lam pays Shu’s salary in cash. After ﬁve months, Shu is ﬁred by Lam. Shu
sues Lam for unpaid salary. In court, Lam argues that there is no contract
between him and Shu. His sister is the owner of the restaurant. According to
Lam, the employment contract was formed between Shu and his sister. He
claims that he was merely an agent for his sister. During the formation of the con-
tract, Shu and Lam never discussed the ownership of the restaurant. Shu never
even met Lam’s sister. The case turns on a question of interpretation. How
should the agreement be interpreted? Did Shu and Lam form an employment con-
tract between themselves, or between Shu and Lam’s sister?
According to the agency rules of State X, Lam had the authority to bind his
sister. If the contract were formed between Shu and Lam’s sister, Lam is not
liable for the remaining salary. The residents of State X generally form employ-
ment contracts with a business or, if the business is not incorporated, with the
owner of the business. This would support an interpretation in favour of Lam.
Shu argues that under Chinese norms, the employer is not necessarily the
business or its owner. Generally, the employer is the person who gives instructions
and pays salaries. These Chinese norms support Shu’s interpretation: he formed an
employment agreement with Lam. Should these Chinese norms be considered
relevant?
2. The non-governing law is connected to the contract – the new machine
Developer and Investor are residents of State Y. They have a plan to develop and
manufacture a new agricultural machine. The parties decide to start a joint venture.
Developer has to design and test the machine while Investor supplies the necessary
funds. Both parties are new to this industry. After some deliberation, they decide to
modify a standard contract that is often used in State Z, the worldwide centre of the
development of agricultural tools and machines. The contract contains a buy-out
clause and other provisions that can be found in most agreements to form a joint
venture. It also contains several provisions that are more speciﬁc to the develop-
ment of agricultural machines. The agreement does not contain a choice of law
7This situation is based on a Dutch Supreme Court (HogeRaad) case: HR 18 November
1983, NJ 1984, 345 (Shu/Lam).
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clause. The law of State Y applies under the conﬂict of laws rules of both State Y
and State Z.
After a few months, the parties experience a setback. A company in State Z
developed a machine that performs many of the functions that the proposed
machine is to perform. Developer states that he is no longer obligated to design
the machine. After all, the agreement states that Developer may abandon the
project if a “competing newly developed machine” is “sold in the agricultural
market”. Investor wants Developer to ﬁnish development so that he can recoup
at least a part of his investment. The competing machine does not perform well
in some weather conditions. This gives the proposed machine an advantage in
certain markets. Furthermore, Investor argues that the competing machine is not
yet “sold in the agricultural market”.
The terms “competing newly developed machine” and “sold in the agricultural
market” are ambiguous. They have no special meaning in the law of State Y. In
contrast, State Z has developed extensive case law about the meaning of terms
such as “competing newly developed machine”. Furthermore, a regulatory
agency of State Z has deﬁned the meaning of “agricultural market”. Are these deﬁ-
nitions relevant to the interpretation of the contract in State Y?
3. Asymmetrical relations to the non-governing law
The previous subsections sketch two situations in which non-governing law can be
relevant. In the ﬁrst case, both parties are connected to the non-governing law. In
the second case, both parties are not connected to the non-governing law, but the
contract is. In both cases, the parties have a symmetrical relationship to the con-
nected law. The non-governing law could also be relevant in situations in which
the parties do not occupy a similar position. For example, it is possible that just
one of the parties is connected to the non-governing law. Could this party argue
that he understood a certain clause in the light of the connected law, even if the
other party does not have a connection with that jurisdiction?
In such a case, the argument for granting inﬂuence to the non-governing law is
not as strong as in the cases described in sections B1 and B2. One could argue that
granting inﬂuence to the non-governing law unduly beneﬁts the party that is con-
nected to this law. After all, if the non-governing law does not support the argument
of the connected party, the party still has the option to forego invoking the non-gov-
erning law, instead relying on the interpretation under the governing law. Further-
more, the “unconnected” party may not be able to prepare for the inﬂuence of the
non-governing law. The unconnected party may not be able to know that the other
party would understand certain clauses in the light of a non-governing law. Next,
he can only understand how this non-governing lawwould inﬂuence the understand-
ing of the other party after investigating the contents of this law. This would impose a
burden on the unconnected party. The previous arguments do notmean that non-gov-
erning law can never inﬂuence the interpretation of contracts in such situations.
However, they do show that the argument for this inﬂuence is weaker.
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C. The relationship between the interpretation of contracts and conﬂict
of laws rules
The subsequent sections are primarily descriptive. They show that non-governing
law can inﬂuence the interpretation of a contract under the current law. However,
interpretation is not the only way in which non-governing law can inﬂuence the
legal consequences of the contract. Conﬂict of laws rules can lead to the appli-
cation of the non-governing law. In these situations, the non-governing law
does not inﬂuence the interpretation of the contract. Instead, it governs the contract
and its interpretation. In many, if not all, of the situations discussed in this paper,
the courts could decide to simply apply the non-governing law.8
This paper discusses several types of connections to non-governing law.
Several of them are also relevant under Restatement (Second) of Conﬂict of
Laws. For example, the intention of the parties as to the governing law has signiﬁ-
cant inﬂuence, even without an explicit choice of law provision.9 Express refer-
ences to laws or legal doctrines that are peculiar to a certain state can be used
to prove that the parties wanted to apply the laws of that state.10 If no intent
can be ascertained, section 188(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Conﬂict of
Laws states that an issue is determined by the law which, with respect to that
issue, has the most signiﬁcant relationship to the transaction and the parties.
One of the relevant contacts is the “domicil, residence, nationality, place of incor-
poration and place of business of the parties”.11
This raises the question of whether it is necessary to consider the non-govern-
ing law when interpreting the contract. Could a conﬂict of laws analysis not lead to
the same results? In contrast to the subsequent sections, this section adopts a nor-
mative approach. It shows that considering non-governing law when interpreting
the contract has independent value, even if conﬂict of laws rules can lead to the
consideration of the connected law.
First, by considering non-governing law during the interpretation of the con-
tract, the court can give inﬂuence to the relevant non-governing law in additional
situations. Even if conﬂict of laws rules could lead to the application of the con-
nected law, they may not actually lead to the application of this law in a particular
8See, eg, n4, 73, 81, 86, 114; section E2(b). This is not meant to imply that the above issues
are universally treated as conﬂict of laws issues. For example, E Rabel, The Conﬂict of
Laws: A Comparative Study. Vol 2. Foreign Corporations: Torts: Contracts in General
(Michigan Legal Studies, prepared by U Drobnig, 2nd edn, 1960) 535–536 expressly
rejects this approach.
9Restatement (Second) of Conﬂict of Laws § 187, comment a, § 188, reporter’s note;
Mayo v Hartford Life Ins Co, 354 F.3d 400, 404 (5th Cir 2004).
10Diamond Intl Corp v Allstate Ins Co, 712 F.2d 1498, 1502 (1st Cir 1983); Assicurazioni
Generali SPA v Clover, 195 F.3d 161, 165 (3d Cir 1999); Restatement (Second) of Conﬂict
of Laws § 187, comment a. Incorporations of legal expressions can also display this intent.
Restatement (Second) of Conﬂict of Laws § 187, comment a. Compare section E2(d).
11Restatement (Second) of Conﬂict of Laws § 188(2)(e). Compare section E1.
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case. A court could decide that the references do not display the intention of the
parties as to the governing law, or that the Chinese nationality of the parties
does not mean that the law of China has the most signiﬁcant relationship to the
contract. Furthermore, a choice of law provision could lead to the application of
a law that is different from the connected legal system.12
Next, by considering non-governing law when interpreting the contract, a
court can give inﬂuence to the laws of multiple jurisdictions. The intention of
the parties can be inﬂuenced by several legal systems.13 For example, the intention
of Investor and Developer (section B2) could have been inﬂuenced by both the law
of State Yand the law of State Z. A conﬂict of laws analysis must lead to the appli-
cation of a single law, at least in regard to a single issue. A court may give undue
inﬂuence to the applicable law when it is not considering whether other laws also
inﬂuenced the intention of the parties. In contrast, if the non-governing law is just
one of the circumstances that inﬂuence the interpretation of the contract, the inﬂu-
ence of both laws can be considered.
One could argue that this difference is of no importance. After all, even
when interpreting a contract, a court must eventually settle on a single interpret-
ation. However, by considering the connections with both jurisdictions, a court
is able to give both laws the weight that they are due. For example, if the con-
tract is connected to both the non-governing and the governing law, the court
could decide that no single legal meaning had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the
intention of the parties. In contrast, if the court does not consider the non-gov-
erning law, it may assign undue inﬂuence to an interpretation in accordance
with the governing law.
Similarly, by considering the non-governing law during the interpretation of
the contract, a court can interpret different clauses in accordance with different
laws without the extensive use of dépeçage. In the contract between the Developer
and Investor (section B2), the argument to interpret the term “agricultural market”
in accordance with the non-governing law of State Z is stronger than the argument
to interpret the buy-out clause in accordance with this law. After all, the term “agri-
cultural market” has a special relationship with the law of State Z. The buy-out
clause does not have such a connection.14 In order to reach a result that is in
accordance with the intention of the parties, a court may decide to apply the
law of State Z to the interpretation of the term “agricultural market” but apply
12Dannemann, supra n 6, at 63; Magnus, supra n 5, at 184; V Hagstrøm, “The Nordic Tra-
dition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses under Norwegian Law” in Cordero-Moss (ed)
supra n 5, 265, 267.
13D Echenberg, “Negotiating International Contracts: Does the Process Invite a Review of
Standard Contracts from the Point of View of National Legal Requirements” in Cordero-
Moss (ed) supra n 5, 11, 18; G Cordero-Moss, “Does the Use of Common Law Contract
Models Give Rise to a Tacit Choice of Law or to a Harmonized Transnational Interpret-
ation?” in Cordero-Moss (ed) supra n 5, 37. Compare section B3.
14See section E2(e).
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the law of State Y to the interpretation of the buy-out clause.15 The text of section
188(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Conﬂict of Laws seems to allow this result.
It states that the rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue are deter-
mined by the law that has the most signiﬁcant relationship with respect to that
issue. Still, the result depends on a detailed division of the issues surrounding
the contract. To reach the result, a court must divide the issue of the interpretation
of the contract into the more speciﬁc issues of the interpretation of single clauses.
Although this approach vindicates the intention of the parties, it invites an
unnecessarily complicated conﬂict of laws analysis.16 Instead of vindicating the
intention of the parties through extensive dépeçage, a court can also give effect
to the intention by considering the non-governing law when interpreting the
contract.17
Furthermore, considering non-governing law during the interpretation of the
contract facilitates a clearer and more detailed analysis. An intention to apply
the connected law can be distinguished from an intention to interpret the contract
in accordance with this law. Similarly, evidence of a general intention to interpret
the contract in accordance with the connected law does not necessarily prove that
the parties intended to interpret a speciﬁc clause in accordance with this law.18 A
conﬂict of laws approach does not differentiate between these various kinds of
intentions. It either applies the connected law or it does not. In contrast, by con-
sidering the non-governing law when interpreting the contract, a court can differ-
entiate the inﬂuence of the connected law. It can give an inﬂuence to this law that is
in accordance with the intention of the parties.
Finally, the conﬂict of laws approach does not explain why the contract should
be interpreted in accordance with the connected law. The application of a law does
not show that the parties intended an interpretation in accordance with this law. In
most cases, the legal meaning of a clause or term in the governing law is of a limited
signiﬁcance. In contrast, voluntary and deliberate connections to the non-governing
law strengthen the argument to interpret the agreement in accordance with this law.
They can show that the parties intended such an interpretation.19
15Compare Cordero-Moss, supra n 13, at 38 (the use of clauses and models that are con-
nected to a law can be interpreted as a tacit choice of law for that particular part of the
contract).
16Compare Dannemann, supra n 6, at 78 (splitting the applicable law to a contract will gen-
erally cause more problems than it solves).
17About the situations in which dépeçage is appropriate, see generally WLM Reese,
“Depecage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law” (1973) Columbia Law Review
58, 60 (dépeçage is appropriate if it effectuates the purpose of the relevant choice of law
rules and does not disappoint the expectation of the parties). Dépeçage can be used to
give effect to the intention of the parties. This is also the goal of the rules of the restatement.
See, e.g. Restatement (Second) of Conﬂict of Laws § 187, comment a, § 188, reporter’s
note.
18See section E2(f).
19See section F7.
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This section does not argue that the conﬂict of laws approach should never be
preferred. If the contract contains a choice of law provision or the connected law
has the most signiﬁcant relationship with the contract, a court should apply the
governing conﬂict of laws rules. This section merely shows that, even though a
conﬂict of laws approach can lead to a similar result, considering non-governing
law during the interpretation of a contract does have independent value. The
“interpretation approach” can give inﬂuence to the connected law even if it
does not apply under the governing conﬂict of laws rules. Furthermore, it can
give inﬂuence to multiple jurisdictions. Finally, it can provide a clearer expla-
nation for the inﬂuence of the connected law.
D. Contract interpretation in the law of the United States
The interpretation of a contract is about ascertaining the meaning of the expression
of the agreement.20 It is a three step process.21 First, a court determines which state-
ments and agreements actually constitute the judicially enforceable contract.22
Next, the court determines whether the contract is ambiguous. A contract or term
is “ambiguous” if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning.23 The
ﬁnal step consists of the interpretation of the contract proper. After determining
20Knifﬁn, supra n 2, at 8; Murray, supra n 1, at 425. See Knifﬁn, ibid at § 24.3, for a dis-
tinction between interpretation and construction. Most courts use these terms
interchangably.
21Burton, supra n 1, at 1–2.
22See EA Posner, “The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of
Contractual Interpretation” (1998) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 533, 541–542.
This step is not a part of the interpretation of the contract proper. It is about identifying the
subject matter of interpretation. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213, comment a;
Knifﬁn, supra n 2, at 104–105; Burton, supra n 1, at 63. During this step, the parole evi-
dence rule plays an important role if the contract is in writing. About this rule, see UCC
§ 2–202; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213; Burton, supra n 1, at 64; P Linzer,
Corbin on Contracts, supra n 2, 8 and 25–26.
23Jacobs v Pickands Mather & Co, 933 F.2d 652, 657 (8th Cir 1991);McAbee Constr Inc v
United States, 97 F.3d 1431, 1434–1435 (Fed Cir 1996);ColumbiaGas Transmission Corp v
NewUlmGas Ltd, 940 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex 1996); Insurance Adjustment Bureau Inc v All-
state Ins Co, 588 Pa. 470, 481 (2006); Knifﬁn, supra n 2, 33–34; Burton, supra n 1, at 106.
This step is omitted under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 202, comment a; Knifﬁn, supra n 2, at 34; Burton, ibid, at 139–140; Linzer, supra
n 22, at 40–41. It is also omitted under the Uniform Commercial Code. UCC § 2–202,
comment 1; Hessler v Crystal Lake Chrysler-Plymouth Inc, 338 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 1021
(2003); Knifﬁn, ibid, at 35; Burton, ibid, at 140–141; LINZER, ibid, at 42–43. However, appli-
cable state law may still impose a requirement to ﬁnd an ambiguity. Linzer, ibid, at 43–47.
During this step, the “plain meaning rule” and the “four corners rule” play important
roles. About these rules, see Indem Ins Co of N Am v Du Pont, 292 F.2d 569, 574 (5th Cir
1961); Fairbourn Commercial Inc v Am Hous Partners Inc, 94 P.3d 292, 295 (Utah
2004); Intermountain Eye & Laser Centers PLLC v Miller, 142 Idaho 218, 222 (2005);
Mundey v Erie Ins Grp, 167 Md. App. 444, 452 (2006); Saleh v Farmers Ins Exch, 133
P.3d 428, 434 (Utah 2006); Burton, ibid, at 109, 111; Linzer, ibid, at 29.
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that an ambiguity exists, it is necessary to resolve this ambiguity and attach a
meaning to the ambiguous contract or clause.24 Different courts have different
views about what circumstances may be considered relevant at each of these
steps. Burton divides these attitudes into three theories: literalism, objectivism
and subjectivism.25 A court may employ a different theory in each of the steps.26
The ﬁrst theory is literalism. “Literalism requires interpretation according to
the literal meaning of the directly applicable words used in a contract, without
taking into account their context.”27 Under literalism, only the words of the con-
tract and a dictionary inﬂuence the interpretation of the contract.28 This excludes
non-governing law as a relevant circumstance. However, even though a court may
state that it applies literalism (the literal meaning of the contract) during one of the
steps of contract interpretation, it may still employ circumstances that should not
be considered under literalism proper.29
For example, in Swiss Bank Corp v Dresser Indus Inc, the court stated that
“Delaware follows the plain meaning rule of contract construction which instructs
courts to rely solely on the clear, literal meaning of the words if a contract is clear
on its face”.30 However, the very next sentence stated that an “unambiguous inte-
grated written contract should be construed in the way that an objective, reason-
able third party would understand it.” This sentence indicates that other
circumstances may be considered relevant, even if the contract is unambiguous.
After all, a reasonable third party may consider the whole document, the
purpose of the contract and its context.31 Next, courts that follow literalism may
still employ the “whole contract” as a relevant circumstance.32
24Burton, supra n 1, at 151.
25Ibid at 2. A court may also employ a mix of these theories. Ibid. at 17.
26Ibid at 2. Compare Friendswood Dev Co v McDade & Co, 926 S.W.2d 280, 282–283 (Tex
1996); Ahsan v Eagle Inc, 287 Ill. App. 3d 788, 791 (1997). In these cases, the court
employed an objective approach while determining whether an ambiguity exists, but a sub-
jective approach while resolving this ambiguity. Evidence about the intentions of the parties
was not allowed until an ambiguity had been established.
27Burton, supra n 1, at 17–18. This approach is comparable to the “hard-PER” of Posner,
supra n 22, at 534.
28Burton, ibid at 14, 36.
29Ibid at 18–19, 41–42, 123–125. See, eg Air Line Pilots Assn Intl v Midwest Exp Airlines
Inc, 279 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir 2002) (the court states that it follows a “literalist” approach,
but a party can use objective evidence to argue that there is an extrinsic ambiguity);Harper-
Wittbrodt Auto Grp LLC v Teague, M200500203COAR3CV, 2006 WL 2706148, 10–11
(Tenn Ct App20 September 2006) (the court states that the literal meaning of a contract
governs its interpretation. However, the language of the contract should be “construed”
with reference to circumstances like the intention and situation of the parties).
30Swiss Bank Corp v Dresser Indus Inc, 942 F Supp 398, 400 (ND Ill 1996). Example from
Burton, supra n 1, at 18–19.
31Burton, supra n 1, at 19.
32Beanstalk Grp Inc v AM Gen Corp, 283 F.3d 856, 859–860 (7th Cir 2002); Burton, supra
n 1, at 19, 41–42. Similarly, the four corners rule is not truly literalist either, as it takes the
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The second theory is objectivism. “[Objectivism] looks for the parties’ intention
as expressed (manifested) in the contract document as a whole and its objective
context, but not the parties’ mental intentions”.33 It gives effect to the intention of
the parties as understood by a reasonable person, taking various circumstances into
account.34 Under objectivism, various circumstances may be taken into account in
addition to those that are allowed under literalism.35 Circumstances that may be rel-
evant under objectivism include the whole contract, its purpose, usages and customs,
the objective circumstances at the time when the contract was made, ordinary mean-
ings, legal meanings, the course of performance and other objective circumstances.36
However, the interpreter cannot consider the subjective intentions of the parties.37
The ﬁnal theory is subjectivism. “[Subjectivism] looks for the mental inten-
tions or knowledge of the parties when they manifested their intentions, taking
into account all relevant evidence”.38 It gives effect to the actual intention of
the parties at the time of the formation of the contract.39 Under subjectivism,
various circumstances may be taken into account in addition to those that are
allowed under objectivism.40 It attaches relevance to the prior course of dealing,
the course of negotiations, testimony by a party about its own intentions, and cir-
cumstances bearing on the parties’ subjective intentions.41
E. The potential inﬂuence of non-governing law on the interpretation of
contracts
Under both objectivism and subjectivism, the interpretation of a contract depends
on the intention of the parties. The interpretation either depends on the actual
intention (subjectivism) or the intention as understood by a reasonable person
(objectivism). Under these theories, non-governing law can inﬂuence the interpret-
ation of a contract if it affects the intention of the parties.
This section analyzes the potential inﬂuence of non-governing law. It explores
several situations in which non-governing law can be a relevant circumstance.
“contract as a whole” into account. Bethlehem Steel Co v Turner Constr Co, 2 N.Y.2d 456,
460 (1957);Murphy v Duquesne Univ of the Holy Ghost, 565 Pa. 571, 591 (2001); Burton,
supra n 1, at 111–112, 126.
33Burton, supra n 1, at 2.
34Knifﬁn, supra n 2, at 25; A Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Sari Bashi trans,
Princeton University Press 2005) 34; Burton, supra n 1, at 2, 41, 44.
35Burton, supra n 1, at 35, 41.
36Ibid at 2, 5, 14, 21–22, 41–51.
37Ginsberg v Mascia, 149 Conn. 502, 506 (1962); Barak, supra n 34, at 33–34; Burton,
supra n 1, at 2, 5, 51.
38Burton, supra n 1, at 2.
39Altshuler v Malloy, 388 P.2d 1, 4 (Okla 1963); Barak, supra n 34, at 31; Burton, supra n 1,
at 51.
40Burton, supra n 1, at 35–36, 51–52.
41Ibid at 35–36, 51–57.
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These situations are grouped in accordance with the type of connection to the non-
governing law. This section starts with situations in which the parties are con-
nected to the non-governing law (section E1). Hereafter, it discusses situations
in which the contract is connected (section E2).
This section discusses the inﬂuence of non-governing law on the interpretation
of contracts. For this reason, the following subsections do not contain detailed
conﬂict of laws analyses. Instead, they assume that the conﬂict of laws rules
lead to the application of a law that is different from the connected law. The
relationship between the inﬂuence of non-governing law on the interpretation of
contracts and the application of the connected law through conﬂict of laws rules
is discussed in section C.
1. The inﬂuence of non-governing law in situations in which the parties are
connected to the non-governing law
In discovering the intention of the parties to the contract, courts are instructed to
place themselves in the shoes of the parties.42 This approach is followed by both
objectivist and subjectivist courts.43 Non-governing law can provide a background
that affects the way in which the parties formulate and understand their contract. A
court that wishes to place itself in the shoes of the parties could consider the non-
governing law that is connected to the parties.44
In Shu/Lam,45 the Dutch Supreme Court (HogeRaad) was faced with the cir-
cumstances described in section B1. The lower court stated that Chinese standards
were irrelevant because Dutch law governed the contract and its formation. The
Supreme Court reversed. It found that, because the parties were Chinese,
Chinese standards could inﬂuence the way in which the parties interpreted each
others’ statements and behaviour. Therefore, under Dutch law,46 the non-govern-
ing Chinese norms could inﬂuence the interpretation of the contract.
This case deals with Dutch, and therefore civil, law. However, a common law
court that wishes to place itself in the shoes of Shu and Lam could also conclude
that their intentions may have been inﬂuenced by Chinese norms. Naturally, this
circumstance does not by itself establish that Lam should be considered the
42Eg St Lucie Cnty Bank & Trust Co v Aylin, 94 Fla. 528, 538 (1927); Fid-Phenix Fire Ins
Co v Farm Air Serv Inc, 255 F.2d 658, 660 (5th Cir 1958); Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts § 209, comment b.
43For a distinctly objectivist formulation, seeDeloro Smelting & Ref Co v US, 317 F.2d 382,
386, 387 (Ct Cl 1963); Iconco v United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 149, 155 (1984). For a distinctly
subjectivist formulation, see Malloy, 388 P.2d at 4.
44Compare Rabel, supra n 8, at 534. Compare HLE Verhagen, Agency in Private Inter-
national Law: The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Agency (Martinus
Nijhoff, 1995) 327–328 for similar reasoning in the context of agency.
45HR 18 November 1983, NJ 1984, 345 (Shu/Lam).
46See HR 13 March 1981, NJ 1981, 635 (Haviltex).
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employer. It is just one of the circumstances that are to be considered in the
interpretation of the contract. Still, it could support the conclusion that the contract
is susceptible to two reasonable meanings, and is therefore ambiguous.
Ha v State47 shows that American courts also consider the ethnicity of the
involved parties, and the norms that are connected to this ethnicity, when deter-
mining the demands that are placed on a reasonable person. Ha and Buu are Viet-
namese. One night, Buu started a ﬁght with Ha. He beat him and threatened to kill
him during and after the ﬁght. Ha was afraid that Buu would carry out his threat.
The next day, he shot Buu in the back. At the trial, Ha claimed that he was acting in
self-defence. To support this defence, Ha stated that in Vietnamese culture, public
threats are carried out and are to be taken seriously.48 The court agreed that Viet-
namese culture can be considered in analyzing whether Ha’s belief that he faced
imminent harm was reasonable.49 Nonetheless, the defence was rejected
because the threat was not imminent.
The case does not concern the interpretation of contracts or non-governing law.
However, it is an example in which the court considers non-governing norms. Fur-
thermore, like the interpretation of contracts, the defence is concerned with subjec-
tive perceptions. If a reasonable person can consider the norms that are connected
to a foreign ethnicity in the context of a criminal trial, there is no reason not to
consider such norms in civil litigation.
In the previous examples, the parties are connected to the non-governing law
because of their ethnicity or origin. The examples deal with connections between
the non-governing law and natural persons. However, a business can also be con-
nected to a non-governing law. Just like natural persons, the agents of a business
may understand the contract or certain terms in the light of the law of their habitual
place of business. For this reason, the circumstance that both businesses conduct
the majority of their activity in another jurisdiction and/or are incorporated in that
jurisdiction can provide an argument for interpreting the contract in accordance
with the law of that jurisdiction.50
A variation on the case of section B2 can provide an example. Investor and
Developer each incorporate and operate a business in State Y. In addition, the
law of State Z applies under the conﬂict of laws rules of State Y. One of the
parties claims that he understood the buy-out clause in the light of the law of
State Y. The fact that both parties have strong connections to State Y supports
this assertion. It provides an argument to interpret the clause in accordance with
the non-governing law of State Y.
Finally, a government entity can be connected to the non-governing law. Like
natural persons and businesses, government entities can enter into contracts. Some
47Ha v State, 892 P.2d 184 (Alaska Ct App 1995).
48Ibid at 189.
49Ibid at 195.
50Magnus, supra n 5, at 196–197, 209.
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of these entities have the power to create and enforce legal rules. These rules may
inﬂuence the interpretation and the performance of the contract, even if they do not
govern the agreement.
NML Capital v Argentina provides an example.51 The facts were as follows.
Argentina issued bonds. These bonds contained a pari passu clause. The pro-
vision stated that “[t]he payment obligations of the Republic under the Securities
shall at all times rank at least equally with all its other present and future unse-
cured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness.”52 Argentina defaulted on its
loans in 2001. The country attempted to restructure its debt by making two
exchange offers. It also passed legislation that prohibited payment under the
original bonds.
The parties disagreed about the interpretation of the pari passu clause. Argen-
tina claimed that in a sovereign context, the provision only provides “protection
from legal subordination or other discriminatory legal ranking by preventing the
creation of legal priorities by the sovereign”.53 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit disagreed. It applied the law of New York, and found that the pro-
vision also protected against the giving of priority to other payment obligations.
Argentina violated this provision by making no payments on the original bonds
while simultaneously servicing the restructured debts. Furthermore, the court
stated that even if Argentina’s interpretation were correct, the legislation would
still violate the clause by barring the recognition of New York judgments in Argen-
tine courts.54
Argentina violated the pari passu clause by enacting and enforcing legis-
lation.55 The non-governing Argentine law did not directly inﬂuence the interpret-
ation of the contract. It was not one of the circumstances that affected the
determination of the intention of the parties. Instead, it was relevant because it
shaped the litigation and created a speciﬁc question of interpretation. In NML
Capital v Argentina, the court discussed the interpretation of the pari passu
clause because the non-governing law violated the provision. Furthermore, the
case shows that the relevance of the non-governing law is affected by the connec-
tion between this law and the parties to the contract. The legislation led to the vio-
lation of the pari passu clause because it was enacted by Argentina, one of the
parties to the contract.
51NML Capital Ltd v Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir 2012), cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 2819 (2013). For more information about this case, see Gregory H Shill, “Boilerplate
Shock” (2014) Tulane Law Review 751, 794–796; NATurchi, note, “Restructuring a Sover-
eign Bond Pari Passu Work-Around: Can Holdout Creditors Ever Have Equal Treatment?”
(2014) Fordham Law Review 2171, 2197–2201.
52NML Capital, ibid at 251.
53Ibid at 258.
54Ibid at 259–260.
55Ibid at 260.
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2. The inﬂuence of non-governing law in situations in which the contract is
connected to the non-governing law
A contract can be connected to the non-governing law in various ways. First, the
contract may contain an express reference to the non-governing law (section E2
(b)). Next, the agreement may be connected to the non-governing law due to an
ineffective choice of law clause (section E2(c)). Furthermore, a contract can incor-
porate a term or a rule of the non-governing law (section E2(d)). Finally, the agree-
ment may be of a type or form that is connected to the non-governing law (section
E2(e)). For each of these connections, the parties may have had a general or a
speciﬁc intention to interpret the contract in accordance with the non-governing
law (section E2(f)). In several of the cases discussed below, the contract is con-
nected to religious rules. Section E2(a) discusses several issues that arise in
these situations.
(a) A note on religious contracts
A contract can be connected to the non-governing law because it is connected to a
certain religion. In the United States, a court cannot inquire into religious matters.
However, it may still enforce religious contracts if this can be done on “neutral
principles”.56 Several cases address the enforcement and interpretation of religious
contracts. Speciﬁcally, various courts address the legal consequences of Islamic
and Jewish marriage contracts. For the purpose of this paper, it is important to
note that these religious rules are also laws.
In Israel, Jewish law governs marriages between Jews.57 Evidence of the dual
(religious and legal) character of such rules can also be found in Minkin v Minkin,
Avitzur v Avitzur and Burns v Burns. In these cases, the parties agreed to conform
to the provisions of the laws of Moses and Israel.58 In other words, the contracts
treat the law as both religious and as a part of the legal system of Israel.59
56Minkin v Minkin, 180 N.J. Super. 260, 264 (Ch Div 1981); Avitzur v Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d
108, 115–116 (1983); Akileh v Elchahal, 666 So. 2d 246, 248 (Fla Dist Ct App 1996); Oda-
talla v Odatalla, 355 N.J. Super. 305, 309 (Ch Div 2002); Thibodeau v American Baptist
Churches of Conn, 120 Conn. App. 666, 673–74 (2010); Light v Light,
NNHFA124051863S, 2012 WL 6743605, 3 (Conn Super Ct6 December 2012); LMWarm-
ﬂash, “The New York Approach to Enforcing Religious Marriage Contracts: From Avit-
zurto the Get Statute” (1984) Brooklyn Law Review 229, 237–241; A Quraishi-Landes,
“Rumors of the Sharia Threat Are Greatly Exaggerated: What American Judges Really
Do with Islamic Family Law in their Courtrooms” (2012) New York Law School Law
Review 245, 249–250.
57M Elon, “The Sources and Nature of Jewish Law and its Application in the State of
Israel – Part III” (1968) Israel Law Review 416, 454.
58Minkin,180 N.J. Super. at 262; Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d at 116; Burns v Burns, 223 N.J. Super.
219, 224 (Ch Div 1987).
59But see infra n 80.
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The inﬂuence of Jewish law in the United States is not limited to the interpret-
ation of marriage contracts. The arbitrators of the New York Diamond Dealers
Club resolve disputes that arise in contracts about the sale of diamonds. They
do not apply the law of New York or another speciﬁc law. Instead, they use estab-
lished trade rules and customs. However, the non-governing Jewish and common
law both inﬂuence the decision in complex cases that are not covered by these
rules.60
Several countries adhere to sharia law to various degrees.61 In these juris-
dictions, sharia is the governing law. It is not just a source of norms outside
of the law. Among other topics, sharia law governs the legal consequences
of a marriage.62
Various recent state statutes in the United States attempt to limit the inﬂuence
of foreign, and speciﬁcally sharia, law. Currently, the constitutionality of such acts
has not been determined conclusively.63 The amendment of the Oklahoma consti-
tution bans all consideration of international, and speciﬁcally sharia, law.
However, an injunction against this amendment is in place.64 Other states have
60L Bernstein, “Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry” (1992) Journal of Legal Studies 115, 125–127, 141, 156–157. As the
arbitrators do not apply a speciﬁc law, this example does not involve American law in a
narrow sense. However, the club is located in New York. Furthermore, appeals to the
decisions are decided under New York law by a New York court.
61L Ali Khan, “Jurodynamics of Islamic Law” (2008) Rutgers Law Review 231, 273–276;
JM Otto, “Introduction: Investigating the Role of Sharia in National Law” in JM Otto (ed)
Sharia Incorporated (Leiden University Press, 2010) 18, 44–48; BJ Kelley, “Comment,
Bad Moon Rising: The Sharia Law Bans” (2013) Loyola Law Review 601, 606. Note
that different Islamic schools of thought or geographic traditions may provide different
interpretations of a provision in the sharia.TR Siddiqui, “Interpretation of Islamic Marriage
Contracts by American Courts” (2007) Family Law Quarterly 639, 643–644, 651, 654;
Otto, ibid, at 23–24. If these differences are relevant for the interpretation of the marriage
contract, a court could decide to interpret the contract in accordance with the tradition that is
most likely to have affected the intention of the parties. For example, a contract could be
interpreted in accordance with the Moroccan tradition if the parties have a Moroccan
origin. In these situations, both the contract and the parties are connected to the non-govern-
ing law. EC Sharpe, “Islamic Marriage Contracts as Simple Contracts Governed by Islamic
Law: A Roadmap for U.S. Courts” (2013) Georgia Journal of Gender and Law 189, 202.
62Khan, supra n 61, at 274; JM Otto, “Towards Comparative Conclusions on the Role of
Sharia in National Law” in Sharia Incorporated, ibid, 613, 629–630; Kelley, supra n 61,
at 603.
63Several authors discuss the constitutionality of these acts: eg, S Topy, “Comment, Sharia
Law in the Sooner State and Beyond: How the First Amendment Impacts the Future of
Anti-Sharia Law Statutes” (2011) University of Cincinnati Law Review 617, 619–630; K
Karseboom, “Note, Sharia Law and America: The Constitutionality of Prohibiting the
Consideration of Sharia Law in American Courts” (2012) Georgia Journal of Law and
Public Policy; Kelley, supra n 61, at 615–631.
64Okla Const art VII, § 1; Awad v Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir 2012).
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passed laws that only ban the consideration of foreign law when such law would
violate (constitutional) rights.65
A discussion of the effects and constitutionality of these statutes falls outside
of the scope of this paper. However, it is important to note that statutes that only
ban the consideration of foreign law when such law would violate certain rights
have no effect on the interpretation of contracts or the role of non-governing
law therein. A contract is ineffective to the extent that it violates mandatory
rules. It is only effective within the legal boundaries set by the governing jurisdic-
tion.66 The inﬂuence of non-governing law on the interpretation of the contract
does not affect these boundaries, and does not make it possible to violate rights
that cannot be violated otherwise.67
(b) The inﬂuence of an express reference to the non-governing law
A contract can contain an express reference to the non-governing law. For
example, the agreement between Developer and Investor (section B2) could
state that “agricultural market” is the market that is designated as such in the regu-
lations of State Z. Furthermore, Shu and Lam (section B1) could agree that Lam
owes Shu an interest on unpaid salaries equal to the highest rate that is allowed by
the Chinese law, and this rate is lower than the maximum rate of State X.68 Only
the courts that adhere to the strictest version of literalism would not consider the
deﬁnition of State Z or the interest rate that is allowed by the law of China. In the
event of an express reference, considering the non-governing law gives effect to
the expressly manifested intention of the parties.69
In Foubert v Turst (1703), the English High Court of Parliament appears to
acknowledge the possible inﬂuence of an express reference to non-governing
law. Two residents of France form a marriage contract. The relevant provision
states that the “intended man and wife shall be joint and common in all goods
moveable, and acquisitions immovable, pursuant to the custom of Paris.”70
They subsequently move to England. The wife dies, and her relatives claim a
part of the inheritance. Their claim is not wholly successful, and they appeal.
65La Rev Stat Ann § 9:6001; Tenn Code Ann § 20–15–101–106; Az Rev Stat Ann § 12–
3101–3103. For an overview of the various “anti-sharia” statutes, see Kelley, supra n 61, at
612–615.
66The public policy of the forum also creates boundaries. A court of State X will not enforce
a contract if this would violate the public policy of State X, even if the contract is governed
by the law of State Y. See, eg In re Marriage of Dajani, 251 Cal. Rptr. 871, 872 (Ct App
1988).
67Cutter v Waddingham, 22 Mo. 206, 1855 WL 5380, 46 (1855); Quraishi-Landes, supra n
56, at 249–251; “Introduction to Part 3” in Cordero-Moss, supra n 5.
68Cutter, 1855 WL 5380, 47; Restatement (Second) of Conﬂict of Laws § 187, illus 4, 5.
69Restatement (Second) of Conﬂict of Laws § 187, comment c.
70Foubert v Turst [1703] 1 Bro. P. C. 129, 129. At that time, the custom of Paris was the
applicable law in the relevant part of France.
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The plaintiffs/appellants admit that the customs of Paris do not bind the parties in
England. However, they claim that the words “according to the custom of Paris”
only serve to explain “what was meant by the word “community”.71 The reference
to the custom served only to interpret the agreement. The defendant/appellee
insists that the reference to the custom was not part of the enforceable contract.
It was merely a “declaration” without legal effect.72 Furthermore, he argues that
the laws of France should not be enforced in England. The court ﬁnds for the
appellants, but the reasoning is not reported.73
In Cutter v Waddingham (1855), the Supreme Court of Missouri addresses a
similar question. A husband and a wife form a marriage contract. In this case,
the relevant provision stated that “the said future spouses to be one and
common in all movable property, and immovable conquests, according to the
ancient custom established in this colony”. The “ancient custom” was the
custom of Paris. However, the contract was governed by Spanish law. Judge
Scott makes it clear that this discrepancy is of no consequence: “[t]he defendants
do not appeal to the custom of Paris as furnishing the rule of law by which the
validity of the contract is to be tested, but as supplying the means, and the only
means by which the intention of the parties can be ascertained.”74
The express reference inﬂuenced the interpretation of the contract. It did not
lead to the application of the custom of Paris. Furthermore, the same result
would follow under English law. After all, the desired legal consequences could
also be reached by expressly writing out all of the relevant provisions:“[b]y the
French and Spanish law, in all cases, and by the English law, with rare exceptions,
parties to contracts are at liberty to adopt any forms of expression to signify their
intentions. They may refer to any document, paper, law, statute, ordinance, custom
or usage, domestic or foreign, and the thing thus referred to becomes a part of the
contract, with the same effect as if its terms were incorporated into the contract in
words. This is familiar learning.”75
In Minkin v Minkin and Burns v Burns, the Jewish marriage contract or
“ketuba” contained an express reference to non-governing law. The parties
agreed to conform to the provisions of the laws of Moses and Israel.76 InMinkin v
71Ibid at 131. Note that the contract, as reported in the case, does not use the word commu-
nity. Instead, the words “according to the custom of Paris” could explain what was meant
by “joint and common”.
72Ibid at 132.
73Ibid at 132. Bayitch states that the court treated the reference as an incorporation of the
non-governing law, see SA Bayitch, “The Connecting Agreement” (1953) Miami Law
Quarterly293, 295, at n 15. Davie treats the case as a choice of law issue, see M Davie,
“Matrimonial Property in English and American Conﬂict of Laws” (1993) International
and Comparative Law Quarterly 855, 879.
74Cutter v Waddingham, 22 Mo. 206, 1855 WL 5380, 42 (1855).
75Ibid at 42.
76Minkin v Minkin, 180 N.J. Super. 260, 262 (Ch Div 1981); Burns v Burns, 223 N.J. Super.
219, 224 (Ch Div 1987).
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Minkin, the parties argue about whether the obligation to give a divorce document
or “get” is civil and enforceable or religious and unenforceable. The court relies on
Jewish law and determines that the obligation is civil.77 In Burns v Burns, the
parties argue about the circumstances under which the husband is obligated to
give such a get. The court uses the laws of Moses and Israel to determine
several situations in which this obligation exists.78
The cases did not contain an explicit conﬂict of laws analysis. For this
reason, it is possible that the court simply applied Jewish law. However, all
issues other than the interpretation of the contract were decided in accordance
with the law of New Jersey. For example, in Minkin v Minkin, the court
ordered a speciﬁc performance of the obligation to secure a get.79 Furthermore,
in Hurwitz v Hurwitz, the court did address the conﬂict of laws question. In this
case, the parties entered into a “koshuba” prior to their marriage. The contract
contained a reference to the laws of Moses and Israel. The court applied the
law of New York: “[t]he contract in question, in my judgment, is not to be deter-
mined by the provisions of the laws of any foreign state. The agreement was
made and executed in the State of New York, by persons who at the time
resided there; the property affected by the litigation is located in the State of
New York and all the parties to the controversy now live within the State and
are amenable to its laws.”80
(c) The inﬂuence of an ineffective choice of law provision
An ineffective choice of law provision may still inﬂuence the interpretation of the
contract. A slight alteration of the circumstances in section B2 can clarify this
point. Developer and Investor insert a choice of law provision, stating that the
law of State Z applies to the interpretation of the contract. Under the conﬂict of
laws rules of State Y, this clause is invalid. However, the interpretation according
to State Z does not violate any laws of State Y.
77Minkin, 180 N.J. Super. at 265–266.
78Burns, 223 N.J. Super. at 225–226.
79Minkin, 180 N.J. Super. at 266. See also Avitzur v Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d 108, 112, 117, 119
(1983); Warmﬂash, supra n 56, at 235; EF Scoles et al, Conﬂict of Laws (Thomson/West,
4th edn, 2004) § 15.24, at n 7.
80Hurwitz v Hurwitz, 216 A.D. 362, 366–367 (NYApp Div 1926). The court also addressed
the question whether the law of Moses and Israel is actually law. It decided that it was not. “I
do not understand that the so-called laws of Moses and Israel are what are known and
accepted as ‘foreign laws.’ The ‘foreign laws’ recognized by us are those of a foreign
state or nation. That calls for ‘a people permanently occupying a ﬁxed territory, bound
together by common laws, habits, and customs [or by a constitution], into one body
politic, exercising, through the medium of an organized government, independent sover-
eignty and control over all persons and things within its boundaries, capable of making
war and peace, and of entering into international relations with other communities.’” Ibid
at 366. Note that this case was decided in 1926, before the founding of Israel.
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By interpreting the agreement in accordance with the law of State Z, a court
can give effect to the intention of the parties. After all, this intention to interpret
the contract in such a manner is expressly manifested in the contract. Furthermore,
the parties could reach the same result by expressly writing out all of the relevant
provisions of the non-governing law.81 Similarly, an effective choice of law pro-
vision can also affect the inﬂuence of non-governing law. The choice of the law of
State Z weakens the argument to consider the law of State Y. The choice of law
provision can indicate that the parties considered the legal consequences of the
contract under the law of State Z. Interpreting a clause according to the law of
State Y could violate this intention.82
Minkin v Minkin and Burns v Burns also provide examples. The agreement to
conform to the provisions of the laws of Moses and Israel can be interpreted as a
choice of law provision. Even if a court would render this provision ineffective, it
can still be used to determine that the parties intended to include an obligation to
provide a “get” in accordance with Jewish law.83
The inﬂuence of (effective or ineffective) choice of law provisions depends on
the circumstances of the case. The parties may choose a law without considering
its effect on the interpretation of the contract or a speciﬁc clause.84 In these cases,
the strength of the argument to consider the provision is weaker than in situations
in which the law is chosen in order to reach the legal consequences that would
follow under that legal system.
(d) The inﬂuence of the incorporation of terms and non-governing rules
A contract can incorporate a legal rule or provision that is taken from a non-gov-
erning law. Instead of referring to the law, the contract simply copies the relevant
rules. Alternatively, the parties copy a clause or term that has a speciﬁc legal
meaning in the non-governing law.85 These rules or terms may be ambiguous in
the law that is governing the interpretation of the contract. If present, a court
should consider the intention of the parties (subjectivism) as understood by a
81Several authors treat this issue as a conﬂict of laws question. In this approach, an ineffec-
tive choice of law provision is treated as effective for the purpose of the interpretation of
contracts. WLM Reese, “Power of Parties to Choose Law Governing their Contract”
(1960) American Society of International Law Proceedings49, 53; D St L Kelly, “Refer-
ence, Choice, Restriction, and Prohibition” (1977) International and Comparative Law
Quarterly857, 867–868;LL McDougal III, RL Felix and RU Whitten, American Conﬂicts
Law § 135, at 500 (Transnational Publishers, 5th edn, 2001); Scoles, supra n 79, § 18.3, at
956–957; Restatement (Second) of Conﬂict of Laws § 204, comment b, d.
82Cordero-Moss, supra n 67, at 117.
83See Warmﬂash, supra n 56, at 236–237. The cases are discussed supra, section E2(b).
84Eg Echenberg, supra n 13, at 15; Dannemann, supra n 6, at 63.
85Section B2. Compare A Menyhárd, “The East European Tradition: Application of Boiler-
plate Clauses under Hungarian Law” in Cordero-Moss, supra n 5, 302, 304 (“imported
clauses”).
524 P. Wolters
reasonable person (objectivism) to give the term or provision the meaning that it
would have under the connected law.86
The argument to consider the non-governing law is especially strong if the bor-
rowed clause is a “boilerplate” provision. Boilerplate provisions are clauses that
are standard in a certain type of contract.87 They have no special meaning in
the particular contract. Instead, they are used because they lead to a standardized
result. For these reasons, boilerplate provisions should be interpreted in a uniform
and consistent way.88 If the provision originates from a non-governing legal
system, the intention of the parties can be vindicated by interpreting the clause
in accordance with the standardized result in the connected law. Still, the govern-
ing law ultimately determines the interpretation of these terms.89
In Cutter v Waddingham, the court discussed the means of interpreting tech-
nical terms that are borrowed from French law. It decided that the words con-
quets, douaire, preﬁx, preciput and ameublissement can only be interpreted with
the aid of French law: “[t]o the ear of a judge of Spanish or English law alone,
they are mere gibberish. By the light of the French law, their meaning is plain.
He who, in expounding this contract, lays aside the French law as a sealed
book, will put away the only interpreter by which the meaning of its terms
can be known.”90
In Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd, the English
Court of Appeal was faced with an Islamic ﬁnance agreement, a “Morabaha”,
that contained a choice of law provision which stated that “Subject to the prin-
ciples of the Glorious Sharia’a, this agreement shall be governed by and construed
86Reese, supra n 81, at 50–51; Kelly, supra n 81, at 858–859, 865–867; Restatement
(Second) of Conﬂict of Laws § 187, comment c; Restatement (Second) of Conﬂict of
Laws § 204, comment a. About German law, see Rabel, supra n 8, at 535–536; Dannemann,
supra n 6, at 70, 78; Magnus, supra n 5, at 189–190. For an example in Italian law, see MC
Vettese, “Multinational Companies and National Contracts” in Cordero-Moss, supra n 5,
20, 28. The division between the intention to apply the connected law during the interpret-
ation of the contract (a conﬂict of laws issue) and the intent to give a meaning to a certain
term in accordance with the non-governing law (an interpretation issue) will not always be
clear. Kelly, supra n 81, at 867; Cordero-Moss, supra n 13, at 38–43. The incorporation of
legal doctrines can be used as evidence that the parties wanted to apply the connected law.
Restatement (Second) of Conﬂict of Laws § 187, comment a, c; Magnus, supra n 5, at 183.
Again, this paper assumes that the relevant conﬂict of laws rules led to the application of a
law that is different from the relevant law. Finally, see Kelly, supra n 81, for a discussion of
this issue in English law.
87Sharon Steel Corp v Chase Manhattan Bank NA691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir 1982).
88Broad v Rockwell International Corp, 642 F.2d 929, 948 (5th Cir 1981); Sharon Steel
Corp, 691 F.2d at 1048; Vettese, supra n 86, at 20–23; Magnus, supra n 5, at 187–188,
Turchi, supra n 51, at 2190.
89Magnus, supra n 5, at 186–188; G Cordero-Moss, “Conclusion: The Self-Sufﬁcient Con-
tract, Uniformly Interpreted on the Basis of its own Terms: An Illusion, But not Fully
Useless” in Cordero-Moss, supra n 5, 344, 370; Turchi, supra n 51, at 2189.
90Cutter v Waddingham, 22 Mo. 206, 1855 WL 5380, 43 (1855).
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in accordance with the laws of England”.91 The court stated that “foreign law” can
be incorporated as a term of the contract. When interpreting such a clause under
English law, the court can consider the way in which the provisions are interpreted
in the non-governing law.92 However, in this case, the unspeciﬁed reference to
Sharia was repugnant to the choice of English law and therefore meaningless.93
In the Dutch case Meyer Europe/PontMeyer,94 Meyer Europe and PontMeyer
disagreed about the interpretation of a share purchase agreement. The contract
used the English language, but was governed by Dutch law. It contained an
entire agreement clause. Entire agreement clauses are typically used in common
law jurisdictions. They have no established function in Dutch law.95 In the agree-
ment, the seller (Meyer Europe) indemniﬁed the purchaser for several taxes, but
not for taxes “included in the provision in the Interim Accounts for corporate
income tax covering the period as of April 1, 1998 up to and including the Econ-
omic Transfer Date.”
The parties disagree about the interpretation of the words “as of”. The lower
court stated that “as of” can mean both “from” and “as per/as at”, but that the
words should be interpreted as “from” in the context of this clause. This con-
clusion was based on a linguistic or grammatical interpretation. The court stated
that several circumstances, and in particular the entire agreement clause, led to
the conclusion that this kind of interpretation should play an important role.
The Dutch Supreme Court (HogeRaad) did not reverse the decision. It stated
that the lower court had used the proper rules of interpretation.
Various authors have pointed out that in common law jurisdictions entire
agreement clauses do not affect the interpretation of the contract proper.
Instead, they inﬂuence the determination of which statements and agreements con-
stitute the judicially enforceable contract.96 In other words, they affect the ﬁrst,
and not the third, step of contract interpretation (section D).
In Lundiform/Mexx,97 the Dutch Supreme Court corrected this discrepancy.
Lundiform and Mexx formed an agreement. Lundiform would supply hardware
for various Mexx shops. The exact quantity was to be determined by
91Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd (No1) [2004] 1 WLR 1784,
1787.
92Ibid at 1799.
93Ibid at 1800.
94HR 19 January 2007, NJ 2007, 575 (Meyer Europe/PontMeyer).
95HR 5 April 2013, NJ 2013, 214 (Lundiform/Mexx); HN Schelhaas, “Pacta sunt servanda
bij commerciële contractanten. Over redelijkheid & billijkheid en objectieve uitleg bij han-
delscontracten” (2008) Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht150, 153. Several
authors discuss the possible legal consequences of an entire agreement clause in Dutch
law. Eg RPJL Tjittes, Uitleg van Schriftelijke Contracten (2009) 88–92; JWA Dousi, “De
entire agreement clause naar Amerikaans en Nederlands recht: afbakening, geen uitleg”
(2013) Contracteren 126, 132–133.
96Eg Schelhaas, supra n 95, at 152; Tjittes, supra n 95, at 89–90; Dousi, supra n 95, at 130.
97HR 5 April 2013, NJ 2013, 214 (Lundiform/Mexx).
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“conﬁrmed forecasts”. The contract used the English language, but was gov-
erned by Dutch law. It contained an entire agreement clause. Before the for-
mation of the contract, Mexx made several promises that did not become
part of the written contract or any of the “conﬁrmed forecasts”. The parties dis-
agreed about whether Mexx was obligated to fulﬁl these commitments. The
lower court decided that the prior promises did not bind Mexx because of
the entire agreement clause. The Supreme Court reversed. It stated that entire
agreement clauses have a speciﬁc origin and function in common law jurisdic-
tions. They have no particular meaning in Dutch law. Although the provision
could inﬂuence the interpretation of a contract, it does not regulate the interpret-
ation of the contract.
Meyer Europe/PontMeyer and Lundiform/Mexx deal with contracts that are
governed by Dutch law. However, the cases are also relevant in the context of
this paper. First, the interpretation of contracts in Dutch law is not radically differ-
ent from American law. The circumstances of the case affect the determination of
the intention of the parties in both Dutch and American law.98
Next, the cases show that non-governing law can have various effects. In Lun-
diform/Mexx, the court did not decide that the clause should be interpreted in
accordance with the connected law. It did not discuss the non-governing law in
order to reach a single correct interpretation. Instead, it referred to the connected
law to show that the interpretation that was given by the lower court was incorrect.
The non-governing law was used to eliminate an interpretation that would lead to
results that are in strong contrast with the legal consequences under the connected
law.
(e) The inﬂuence of the type or form of a contract
The contract may be of a type or form that is connected to the non-governing
law.99 For example, the contract between Developer and Investor has the same
form as the standard agreements that are used in State Z. Furthermore, the type
of the contract, an agreement concerning the development of agricultural
machines, is also connected to this state. After all, State Z is the worldwide
centre of the development of such machines.
The connection provides an argument for an interpretation in accordance with
the connected non-governing law. It can be used to argue that the parties intended
such an interpretation. However, the force of this argument may vary depending
on the conﬂict. The argument is stronger if the conﬂict is about an issue that is
speciﬁcally connected to the non-governing law. It is weaker if the conﬂict has
no special connection to the non-governing law.
98About Dutch law, eg HR 13 March 1981, NJ 1981, 635 (Haviltex); HR 20 February 2004,
NJ 2005, 493 (DSM/Fox).
99Compare G de Nova, “The Romanistic Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses
under Italian Law” in Cordero-Moss, supra n 5, 227, 228 (“alien contracts”).
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For example, the contract between Developer and Investor contains clauses
that are particular to the development of agricultural machines. The clauses con-
taining the terms “competing newly developed machine” and “agricultural
market” are only used in contracts about the development of such machines.
For these clauses, the argument to consider the law of State Z is strong. In contrast,
the contract also contains clauses and terms that are used in every joint venture
contract. For these clauses, the argument to consider the non-governing law is
weaker. For example, unless the buy-out clauses are of a type or form that is par-
ticular to joint ventures concerning the development of agricultural machines,
there is no reason to give much inﬂuence to the non-governing law.100
In practice, this issue can arise in international commercial transactions. These
contracts may be drafted in the English language and use contract models that are
developed in common law jurisdictions, even if the contract is governed by
another legal system.101 However, examples of the inﬂuence of non-governing
types or forms can also be found in American cases.
Cutter v Waddingham provides an example of the inﬂuence of the form of the
contract. Judge Scott stated that if, “in taking up the marriage contract, and exam-
ining it as a whole, by its parts and its four corners, we recognize it as a formula
devised under a particular jurisprudence to accomplish particular purposes, we
must have recourse to that jurisprudence to learn the purposes to be accomplished,
and in this way become acquainted with the real intention of the parties expressed
in the contract.”102 In other words, the non-governing custom of Paris (section E2
(b)) inﬂuences the interpretation of the contract when the formula is connected to
this law. Furthermore, Scott places emphasis on the purpose of the contract. The
argument to consider the connected law is stronger when the form of the contract
has been chosen to reach the results that would follow under the connected law.
In addition to “normal” contracts whose type or form is connected to the non-
governing law, a contract can also be connected to another legal system because it
is connected to a certain religion. As stated in section E2(a), various courts discuss
the legal consequences of Jewish and Islamic marriage contracts. The circum-
stance that the parties elect to enter into a Jewish or Islamic marriage contract
100See Magnus, supra n 5, at 200–202 about this issue under German law.
101Eg Vettese, supra n 86, at 20; Dannemann, supra n 6, at 62; Cordero-Moss, supra n 67, at
115–116; Magnus, supra n 5, at 179, 187; Cordero-Moss, supra n 89, at 347. See also n 86;
section E2(d).
102Cutter v Waddingham, 22 Mo. 206, 1855 WL 5380, 43 (1855). For another example, see
AJ Le Cras, The Laws, Customs, and Privileges, and their Administration, in the Island of
Jersey; with Notices of Guernsey; Also a Commentary on Certain Abuses, and a Petition to
Parliament for Reform of the Same (Longman & Co, 1839) 233.Le Cras also places empha-
sis on the connection between the contracting parties and the non-governing law (section
E1). He discusses an example in which a marriage contract was made by a domiciled Scots-
man in the Scottish form.
528 P. Wolters
indicates intent to be bound by Jewish or Islamic law.103 An interpretation in
accordance with these laws may help to vindicate this intent.
In Odatalla v Odatalla,104 a man and a woman formed a “mahr” agree-
ment, an agreement connected to an Islamic marriage. In this agreement, the
man promised to pay the woman one golden coin prompt and $10,000 post-
poned.105 After the divorce, the woman demands the unpaid sum of $10,000.
The parties disputed the meaning of the word “postponed”. The man states
that the contract is too vague to constitute an enforceable contract. The court
disagrees. It ﬁnds that the woman offered evidence that “postponed” means
that the sum would be payable at any time that she demanded it, but that
Islamic custom prescribes that the demand is only made in the event of a
death or divorce.106 The court refers to Islamic custom. However, this
custom is a part of the sharia. It is binding in the jurisdictions in which
sharia law governs matters of family law.
In Rahman v Hossain,107 the parties disputed the legal consequences of amahr
or “sadaq”. In this case, the man had already paid the full amount to the woman.
However, he demanded a refund after the divorce. The court granted this refund. It
relied on expert testimony that stated that, under Islamic law and customs, the
payment and retention is contingent upon neither party having fault that leads to
the termination of the marriage.108 The court further relied on Islamic law to
ﬁnd that the woman was at fault.109
In these cases, there was no explicit conﬂict of law analysis. This leaves open
the possibility that the court was applying Islamic law and was not merely using
it to interpret the agreement. Note, however, that Rahman v Hossain refers to
New Jersey rules for other issues such as the validity of the marriage and
certain procedural rules.110 Similarly, Odatalla v Odatalla relied on a New
Jersey case to establish the validity and formation of the contract.111 Next, in
Aziz v Aziz, the New York court held that the mahr was enforceable because it
conformed to the requirements of the (New York) General Obligations Law §
5–701(a)(3).112
103Compare OT Mohammedi, “Sharia-Compliant Wills: Principles, Recognition, and
Enforcement” (2012) New York Law School Law Review 259, 285 (arguing that religious
arbitration is the best way to vindicate the intention of the parties).
104Odatalla v Odatalla, 355 N.J. Super. 305 (Ch Div 2002).
105Ibid at 308. About this case and “mahr” agreements, see generally Siddiqui, supra n 61,
at 650.
106Ibid at 312–313.
107Rahman v Hossain, A-5191-08T3, 2010 WL 4075316 (NJ Super Ct App Div, 17 June
2010).
108Ibid at 1.
109Ibid at 2.
110Ibid at 1, 4.
111Odatalla v Odatalla, 355 N.J. Super. 305, 312 (Ch Div 2002).
112Aziz v Aziz, 127 Misc. 2d 1013, 1013–1014 (NY Sup Ct 1985).
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(f) The intention to interpret a contract in accordance with the non-governing
law can be general or speciﬁc
In the previous sections, it is assumed that the parties to the contract intended an
interpretation in accordance with the connected non-governing law. However,
such intent may not exist. The parties may have had an interpretation in mind
that is different from the interpretation under the connected non-governing law.
For example, even if the parties include an ineffective choice of law provision
(section E2(c)), they may not have considered the interpretation of a speciﬁc
clause according to that non-governing law. Similarly, the Investor and Developer
might have casually adopted the standard contract and terms from State Z (sections
E2(d) and E2(e)). They may not have thought about the deﬁnition of “agricultural
market” or the fact that this term might have different meanings under the laws of
State Y and State Z.113
This does not mean that the non-governing law is of no consequence. The non-
governing law still provides an argument for a certain interpretation. After all, a
connection with the non-governing law makes it more likely that the parties
intended an interpretation that is in accordance with this law. For example, an inef-
fective choice of law clause indicates that the parties generally intended the legal
obligations that would follow under the chosen law, even if they did not consider
the meaning of a speciﬁc clause. Similarly, parties may incorporate a term or rule
because of the expectation that this term or rule leads to satisfactory and workable
legal obligations. Such an expectation can be inﬂuenced by the interpretation of
these terms or rules in the connected non-governing legal system, even if the
parties did not consider the exact legal consequences. Again, this provides an argu-
ment that the parties generally intended an interpretation in accordance with the
non-governing law, even if they did not expect a speciﬁc interpretation.
Evidence of a general intention to interpret the contract in accordance with the
non-governing law can inﬂuence the interpretation of a contract. For example, it
can be used to argue that a certain clause is reasonably susceptible to more than
one interpretation. However, the inﬂuence of the non-governing law will be
limited. Further proof of the actual intention (subjectivism) or the intention as
understood by a reasonable person (objectivism) may be required to actually
adopt this interpretation.114
In contrast, if it is possible to show that the parties intended to interpret a
speciﬁc clause in accordance with the non-governing law, the inﬂuence of the
non-governing law is greater. For example, further evidence can support the argu-
ment that the parties incorporated a speciﬁc provision in order to reach the speciﬁc
113Magnus, supra n 5, at 192.
114Compare Magnus, supra n 5, at 191–192, 196–197, 208–209 (under German law, the use
of a common law contract form does not lead to the interpretation of the contract in accord-
ance with English or American law by itself. Similarly, it should not be regarded as a tacit
choice of law); Cordero-Moss, supra n 89, at 350.
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result that would follow under the non-governing law. In these situations, the argu-
ment to interpret the clause in accordance with the non-governing law is strong.
F. The relation between non-governing law and other circumstances that
inﬂuence the interpretation of contracts
In the current literature on the interpretation of contracts, the inﬂuence of several
relevant circumstances has been analyzed.115 This section explores the relation-
ship between several of these circumstances and non-governing law.
Some circumstances can show that the parties intended an interpretation in
accordance with the non-governing law. The non-governing law can inﬂuence
the interpretation “through” other circumstances like the contract as a whole
(section F1), its purpose (section F2), the course of performance (section F3),
the prior course of dealing (section F4) and the course of negotiations (section
F5). This provides an argument for the inﬂuence of non-governing law. If non-
governing law can inﬂuence the interpretation of a contract “indirectly” through
other circumstances, there is no reason to deny “direct” inﬂuence.
Other circumstances inﬂuence the interpretation of the contract in a way that is
similar to the inﬂuence of non-governing law. Considering non-governing law is
not fundamentally different from considering usages and customs (section F6) or
legal meanings (section F7). These circumstances also provide an argument for the
inﬂuence of non-governing law. If these circumstances routinely inﬂuence the
interpretation of a contract, there is no reason to categorically exclude the con-
sideration of non-governing law.
This section shows that non-governing law has a clear connection to several of
the more established circumstances that inﬂuence the interpretation of a contract.
However, this does not mean that the recognition of the inﬂuence of non-govern-
ing law on the interpretation of contracts is without independent value (F8).
1. The contract as a whole
Contract clauses are not read in isolation. A contract should be read as a whole and
interpreted in the light of its general purpose.116 This circumstance is relevant in
situations in which the contract as a whole is connected to the non-governing law.
Such a connection can exist in the situations that are discussed in section E2. It can
exist because of express references to non-governing law (section E2(b)), an inef-
fective choice of law provision (section E2(c)), multiple incorporations of non-
115Eg Knifﬁn, supra n 2, § 24.10, § 24.13, § 24.16–17, § 24.20–21; Burton, supra n 1, at
37–57.
116Central Hanover B& T Co v CIR, 159 F.2d 167, 169 (2d Cir 1947); Sternbergh v Fehling,
396 Pa. 280 (1959); WWWAssociates Inc v Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, 162–163 (1990);
Westmoreland Coal Co v Entech Inc, 100 N.Y.2d 352, 358 (2003); Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 202(2); Knifﬁn, supra n 2, § 24.21; Burton, supra n 1, at 41–42.
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governing rules (section E2(d)) and/or a type or form of contract that is connected
to the non-governing law (section E2(e)).
In these situations, the contract as a whole can show that the parties intended
an interpretation in accordance with the non-governing law. In most of these situ-
ations, the contract as a whole will only display a general intention to such an
interpretation. The contract as a whole is less likely to display such an intention
in regard to a speciﬁc clause.117
The contract as a whole can provide evidence of the intention to interpret the
contract in accordance with the non-governing law. This is especially relevant if a
court only considers a limited number of circumstances when interpreting the con-
tract. In these courts, non-governing law can still exert inﬂuence “through” the
contract as a whole. After all, even courts that follow literalism may still consider
the “whole contract” as a relevant circumstance.118
2. The purpose of the contract
The purpose of a contract or a clause inﬂuences its interpretation. If a shared
purpose can be ascertained, it provides a strong argument for an interpretation
in accordance with this purpose.119 The parties can shape their contract in a
certain way for the purpose of reaching the results that would follow under the
non-governing law. For example, such a purpose can be manifested through an
ineffective choice of law provision (section E2(c)) or by copying a form that is
speciﬁc to the non-governing jurisdiction (section E2(e)). In these situations, the
parties may have had a general purpose of establishing the legal consequences
that would follow under the non-governing law. Alternatively, the parties can
make speciﬁc references to the non-governing law (section E2(b)) or incorporate
speciﬁc terms and rules (section E2(d)). Such references and incorporations could
show the purpose to establish the speciﬁc results that would follow under the non-
governing law.
3. The course of performance
The course of the performance of the contract inﬂuences the interpretation of the
contract.120 The performance can provide evidence of the parties’ intention to
interpret the agreement in accordance with the non-governing law.
117See section E2(f).
118Section D, n 32.
119Teig v Suffolk Oral Surgery Assocs, 2 A.D.3d 836, 837–838 (NYApp Div 2003); Falk-
owski v Imation Corp, 132 Cal. App. 4th 499, 510 (2005); Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts § 202(1); Knifﬁn, supra n 2, § 24.20; Burton, supra n 1, at 44–45.
120Den Norske Bank AS v First Natl Bank of Boston, 75 F.3d 49, 52–53 (1st Cir 1996); Coli-
seum Towers Associates v Nassau, 2 A.D.3d 562, 564 (NYApp Div 2003); UCC § 1–303(a)
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For example, assume that the contract between Developer and Investor con-
tains even more clauses that have no special meaning in the law of State Y, but
which have been interpreted and deﬁned by the courts and regulatory agency of
State Z (section B2). After the formation of the contract, the parties consistently
behave in accordance with the meaning that these clauses would have under the
law of State Z. This conduct does not just provide an argument for an interpret-
ation of these clauses in accordance with the non-governing law, it is also evidence
that the parties intended to interpret other provisions in accordance with the law of
State Z.
4. The prior course of dealing
The conduct of the parties in similar, prior contracts with each other inﬂuences the
interpretation of the contract.121 Like the course of performance, the prior course
of dealing can provide evidence of the parties’ intention to interpret the agreement
in accordance with the non-governing law.
For example, assume that Investor and Developer have started joint ventures
before (section B2). Each of their contracts was strongly connected to the law
of another jurisdiction and contained clauses that had a speciﬁc meaning in that
jurisdiction. In each joint venture, the parties consistently behaved in accordance
with the interpretation that these clauses would have under the (governing) law of
State Y. This conduct provides an argument against the interpretation of the
clauses in accordance with the law of State Z. Alternatively, if the parties consist-
ently interpreted the provisions in accordance with the connected non-governing
laws, the argument to consider the law of State Z would be stronger.
5. The course of negotiations
The course of negotiations inﬂuences the interpretation of the contract.122 The
negotiations can show that the parties intended a meaning in accordance with
the non-governing law. They can reveal an intention about a speciﬁc clause and
a general intention to establish the legal consequences that the contract would
have under the non-governing law.
For example, Shu asks Lam about the structure of his employment (section
B1). Lam answers that all these things are “just like at home”. The negotiations
and § 2–208(1); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(5); Knifﬁn, supra n 2, § 24.16;
Murray, supra n 1, at 491–493; Burton, supra n 1, at 50–51.
121Capitol Converting Equip Inc v Lep Transp Inc 750 F. Supp. 862, 865 (ND Ill 1990);Den
Norske Bank AS, 75 F.3d at 52–53; UCC § 1–303(b); Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
202(5), § 223(2); Knifﬁn, supra n 2, § 24.17; Murray, supra n 1, at 490–491; Burton, supra
n 1, at 52–54.
122Den Norske Bank AS, 75 F.3d at 52–53; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(5);
Knifﬁn, supra n 2, § 24.10, at 64–82; Burton, supra n 1, at 54–56.
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provide a strong argument for the inﬂuence of Chinese law in relation to the issue
of identifying the employer.
6. Usages and customs
Usages and customs inﬂuence the interpretation of contracts. A contract can be
interpreted in accordance with the relevant usages and customs.123 Usages and
non-governing law inﬂuence the interpretation of contracts in a similar way.
Both constitute sets of rules that provide an argument for an interpretation in
accordance with these rules. The fact that some sets of rules (usages and
customs) can inﬂuence the interpretation of contracts suggests that the inﬂuence
of other sets of rules (non-governing law) is at least possible. It provides an argu-
ment for the inﬂuence of non-governing law.
However, several differences between usages and non-governing legal rules
limit the strength of this analogy. Most importantly, customs and usages are nar-
rowly deﬁned. In UCC § 1–303(c) and Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 222
(1), a usage of trade requires such a regularity of observance in a place, vocation,
or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the
transaction in question. Other deﬁnitions are narrower, requiring that both
parties know the usage or that they should have known it because it was longstand-
ing, notorious, well-established, and invariable, at the time and place of the for-
mation of the contract.124
Non-governing law does not necessarily fulﬁl these requirements. For
example, most restaurants in State X do not observe Chinese rules (section B1).
Even if you apply a narrower trade or vocation, such as the business of running
a Chinese restaurant, it can be hard to prove a regular observance that justiﬁes
an expectation that it will be observed. At the same time, the parties may not
have known the speciﬁc Chinese rules. They may just have had a general intention
or expectation to contract in a manner that is in accordance with the Chinese
rules.125
Non-governing law is not just another kind of usage or custom. However, this
does not mean that non-governing law cannot inﬂuence the intentions or expec-
tations of the parties. Like usages and customs, non-governing law can provide
a background that affects the way in which the parties formulate their contract.
Even if the contract itself is not connected to the non-governing law, the
parties’ ethnicity or place of business can inﬂuence the way in which the parties
123Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co v Shell Oil Co Inc, 664 F.2d 772, 795 (9th Cir 1981); US
Naval Inst v Charter Commns Inc, 875 F.2d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir 1989); Den Norske Bank
AS, 75 F.3d at 53; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(5), § 220(1); Knifﬁn, supra n 2,
§ 24.13; Burton, supra n 1, at 47–48.
124SR Intl Bus Ins Co Ltd v World Trade Ctr Properties LLC, 467 F.3d 107, 134 (2d Cir
2006); Burton, supra n 1, at 47.
125See section E2(f).
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understand the contract (section E1). If a party can provide evidence that the inten-
tions of the parties were affected by the connected law, there is no reason not to
consider the non-governing law.126
7. Legal meanings
The legal meaning of a term as evidenced by a statute or legal precedent inﬂuences
the interpretation of contracts. It provides an argument to interpret the contract
term in accordance with the legal meaning.127 In most cases, the contract and
the parties are connected to the governing law. This provides an argument for
the inﬂuence of the legal meaning according to the governing law. However,
if the contract or the parties are connected to a non-governing law, the legal
meaning according to the non-governing law could inﬂuence the intention of
the parties.
In most cases, the legal meaning of a term is of limited importance. In the end,
it is the intention of the parties that governs the interpretation of the contract.128 In
many cases, the legal meaning was not known to the parties and did not affect their
intentions or expectations.129 Section E2(f) explains that a contract that is con-
nected to the non-governing law does not necessarily display an intention to inter-
pret speciﬁc clauses in accordance with the non-governing law. However, certain
connections can provide an argument for the existence of such an intention. The
decision to make a reference to the non-governing law (section E2(b)), include
a choice of law provision (section E2(c)) or incorporate a term or rule (section
E2(d)) suggests that the parties have put some thought into the legal consequences
of the various clauses. In contrast to a "normal" contract that is connected to the
governing law, the parties voluntarily and deliberately created a connection with
a legal system. This shows that, compared with contracts without a connection
to another legal system, the argument to consider the (non-governing) legal
meaning is stronger if the contract is connected to non-governing law.
The relevance of voluntary and deliberate connections with a (non-governing)
legal system can be illustrated by Frigaliment v Intl Sales Corp.130 In this case, a
New York corporation sold a large amount of “chicken” to a Swiss corporation.
The contract was governed by the law of New York.131 The parties predominantly
126See Knifﬁn, supra n 2, § 24.8, § 24.13, at 116.
127Petula Assocs Ltd v Dolco Packaging Corp, 240 F.3d 499, 503 (5th Cir 2001); Teig v
Suffolk Oral Surgery Assocs, 2 A.D.3d 836, 837 (NY App Div 2003); In re Estate of
Uzelac, 114 P.3d 1164, 1168–69 (Utah Ct App 2005); Burton, supra n 1, at 48–50.
128Della Ratta Inc v Am Better Community Developers Inc, 38 Md. App. 119, 129 (1977);
Flintkote Co v General Acc Assur Co, 410 F. Supp. 2d 875, 887 (ND Cal 2006); Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts § 201, comment c; Burton, supra n 1, at 48–49.
129Burton, supra n 1, at 50.
130Frigaliment Importing Co v BNS Intl Sales Corp, 190 F. Supp. 116 (SDNY 1960).
131Ibid at 118.
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communicated in German. However, they used the English word “chicken”
instead of the German “Huhn”. The buyer claims that this word was used
because “chicken” means young chicken whereas “Huhn” can also refer to
older “stewing” chicken. He states that the seller should have realized this
because its ofﬁcers were thoroughly conversant with German.132
In other words, the buyer claims that the parties deliberately used the word
“chicken” in order to avoid the legal consequences that would follow if the
parties had used the word “Huhn”. This would provide an argument against the
interpretation of the word “chicken” in accordance with the meaning of the
word “Huhn”. Therefore, according to the buyer, “chicken” does not include
older birds. The court does not deny the potential inﬂuence of the (legal)
meaning and avoidance of the word “Huhn”. However, Judge Friendly stated
that “[w]hatever force this argument might otherwise have” is drained away by tes-
timony that states that the representative of the buyer afﬁrmed that “any kind of
chickens”, including Huhn, were wanted.133 Furthermore, the contract contained
a reference to the Department of Agriculture’s regulations. The court stated that
the contract “made the regulations a dictionary”. Under these regulations,
“chicken” can also refer to stewing chicken.134
After reviewing the evidence, the court concluded that the seller believed that
it could comply with the contract by delivering older birds and that this subjective
intent coincides with an objective meaning of the word “chicken”. The buyer did
not prove that “chicken” was used in a narrower sense. Therefore, the seller could
fulﬁl its obligations by delivering stewing chicken.135
In Frigaliment, the court considered the inﬂuence of two legal meanings on the
interpretation of the contract. In both instances, the extent to which the parties
voluntarily created a connection with the legal meaning affected its inﬂuence.
First, the express reference to the Department of Agriculture’s regulations
increased the relevance of the regulations’ deﬁnitions. This provided an argument
for the interpretation that was proposed by the seller. On the other hand, the incon-
sistency of the avoidance of the word “Huhn” diminished the inﬂuence of the argu-
ment. The representative of the buyer afﬁrmed that “Huhn” were wanted. For this
reason, there was no deliberate avoidance of this word.
132Ibid at 118. This knowledge of German makes the relation to the non-governing law less
asymmetrical. Compare section B3.
133Ibid at 118. The buyer and the court do not discuss the legalmeaning of the word “Huhn”
under any particular non-governing law. However, it is possible that the meaning of the
word “Huhn” coincides with its interpretation in legal systems that primarily use the
German language. Furthermore, trade usages about the word “Huhn” are more likely to
become established in jurisdictions in which the German language is used. The buyer did
not only claim to avoid the word “Huhn”. He also avoided the legal meaning of this
word in the non-governing legal systems.
134Ibid at 120.
135Ibid at 121. In addition to the discussed arguments, the court also considered a dictionary,
usages and the market prices.
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8. The independent inﬂuence of non-governing law
The previous subsections show that non-governing law has a clear connection to
several of the more established circumstances that inﬂuence the interpretation of a
contract. The non-governing law can inﬂuence the interpretation “through” these
other circumstances. Again (section C), this raises the question of whether it is
necessary to consider the non-governing law when interpreting the contract.
Could the consideration of other circumstances lead to the same results?
In this subsection, it will be shown that non-governing law can be associated
with the more established circumstances in different ways. The independent inﬂu-
ence of the connected law depends on its relation to the other circumstances.
(a) The inﬂuence of non-governing law depends on other circumstances
In some situations, non-governing law inﬂuences the interpretation of a contract
after the intention to interpret the contract in accordance with the connected law
has been established by other circumstances. Cutter v Waddingham provides an
example. Judge Scott stated that the contract as a whole (section F1) showed
that the marriage contract was devised to accomplish particular purposes
(section F2) under the custom of Paris.136 The inﬂuence of the custom of Paris
on the interpretation of the contract was limited to clarifying the legal conse-
quences that would follow under this non-governing law.
In these situations, the intention of the parties cannot be ascertained without
considering the non-governing law. However, the inﬂuence of the non-governing
law depends on other circumstances. The connected law is important because
other circumstances established that the parties intended the legal consequences
that would follow under this law. The inﬂuence of the non-governing law is
similar to the inﬂuence of a dictionary. A court can use the connected law to deter-
mine the meaning of “ameublissement”, just as it can use a dictionary to determine
the meaning of “chicken”.137 However, other circumstances may be necessary to
establish that the parties intended an interpretation in accordance with the non-
governing law or a dictionary.
(b) Non-governing law affects the inﬂuence of other circumstances
In other situations, no clear sequence between the non-governing law and the other
circumstances exist. Instead, the non-governing law and the more established cir-
cumstances increase each other’s relevance. For example, Lam gave instructions
and paid the salary of Shu (section B1). By itself, this course of performance
136Cutter v Waddingham, 22 Mo. 206, 1855 WL 5380, 43 (1855). See also section E2(e).
137Compare Frigaliment, 190 F. Supp. at 121. In this case, the dictionary did not prove the
intention of the parties. It only showed that the interpretation that was advanced by the
defendant was reasonable.
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does not support the conclusion that Lam was the employer. After all, if Lam acted
as an agent for his sister during the formation of the contract, he could also act as
an agent during its performance. The non-governing Chinese norms provide the
context that is necessary to understand the relevance of the course of performance.
Under these norms, the employer is the person that gives the instructions and pays
the salary. By performing these actions, Lam acted as if he was the employer.
In these situations, the non-governing law plays an independent role. Its rel-
evance does not depend on other more established circumstances. Instead, the
importance of the other circumstances, such as the course of performance,
cannot be understood without considering the non-governing law.
It is possible to deemphasize the inﬂuence of the non-governing law. For
example, a court could use Chinese norms to show that the course of performance
supports the conclusion that Lam was the employer. This reasoning suggests that
the non-governing law merely affects the interpretation “through” another more
established circumstance. Although the reasoning can lead to the same result, it
is not very clear. It deemphasizes the circumstance that actually affected the inten-
tion of the parties in favour of a circumstance that shows that the parties had a par-
ticular intention. Shu thought that he formed a contract with Lam because of the
Chinese norms. The circumstance that Lam acted as if he was the employer merely
strengthens the argument to consider these non-governing rules.138 Instead, the
reasoning should reﬂect the importance of the different circumstances. In this
example, the combination of the Chinese norms and the course of performance
provides an argument to interpret the agreement in accordance with the non-gov-
erning law. By emphasizing the role of the non-governing law, a court can provide
a clearer explanation for the conclusion that the contract should be interpreted in
accordance with the Chinese norms.
(c) No relation between non-governing law and other circumstances
Section F deals with situations in which the connected law has a relationship with
another circumstance. Such a connection does not necessarily exist in every
example of the inﬂuence of non-governing law. Furthermore, the relationship
between the non-governing law and the other circumstances will not always be
clear. In these situations, the connected law has an independent inﬂuence on the
interpretation of the contract.
For example, section F discusses several examples of possible connections
between the non-governing law and other circumstances in the conﬂict between
Developer and Investor (section B2). However, the non-governing law can also
inﬂuence the interpretation of the contract without these connections. The fact
that the parties incorporated several terms and provisions (section E2(d)) can
138For more examples in which other circumstances strengthen the argument to consider
non-governing law, see sections F3, F4 and F5.
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provide an argument for the interpretation of these clauses in accordance with the
law of State Z, even if the course of performance (section F3), dealing (section F4)
or negotiations (section F5) does not show that the parties intended the legal con-
sequences that would follow under this non-governing law.
The discussed cases also show that a court does not always refer to non-gov-
erning law in combination with other more established circumstances. In Foubert v
Turst, the non-governing custom of Paris inﬂuenced the interpretation of the con-
tract because of an express reference. The case does not point to any other circum-
stances that increase its importance.139 In Lundiform/Mexx, the Dutch Supreme
Court used non-governing common law to interpret an incorporated entire agree-
ment clause. The court did not refer to any relationship between the connected law
and other relevant circumstances.140 Even in Shu/Lam, the inﬂuence of the
Chinese norms did not depend on the connection with the course of performance.
The Dutch Supreme Court simply stated that the Chinese norms could be relevant
because the parties were Chinese.141
Even in these situations, it is possible to deemphasize the importance of the
non-governing law in favour of the more established circumstances. For
example, it is possible to argue that the express reference to the custom of Paris
in Foubert v Turst, or the incorporation of several terms and provisions in the con-
tract between Developer and Investor, shows that the contract as a whole (section
F1) or a single provision was devised to accomplish a particular purpose (section
F2).142 However, such reasoning is unnecessarily complicated and will not be con-
vincing in all situations.
First, it is unnecessarily complicated because it replaces “intention” with
“purpose”. In the United States, circumstances inﬂuence the interpretation of
the contract if they establish the actual intention (subjectivism) or the intention
as understood by a reasonable person (objectivism). The purpose of the contract
can affect the interpretation. However, the relevance of other circumstances
does not depend on their connection with the purpose of the contract.
Next, the reasoning will not be convincing if the references and incorporations
are not sufﬁcient to establish a purpose. Non-governing law is just one of the cir-
cumstances that can be used to interpret the agreement. Other circumstances could
lead to the conclusion that the contract or clause had another purpose or that the
purpose is not clear. In these situations, the non-governing law would not inﬂuence
the interpretation of the contract. By treating the non-governing law as a
139Foubert v Turst [1703] 1 Bro. P. C. 129, 129; section E2(b). Note that the custom of Paris
was the applicable law in the relevant part of France. The court does not refer to “custom” in
the sense of section F6.
140HR 5 April 2013, NJ 2013, 214 (Lundiform/Mexx); section E2(d).
141HR 18 November 1983, NJ 1984, 345 (Shu/Lam); sections E1, F3 and1ANGLE1MSO-
DEL2ANGLE21ANGLE1/MSODEL2ANGLE2 F8(B).
142Compare Cutter v Waddingham, 22 Mo. 206, 1855 WL 5380, 43 (1855); section F8(a).
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circumstance that directly affects the interpretation, it is possible to consider the
connected law in additional situations.
Furthermore, it is possible to stretch the deﬁnitions of “usages and customs”
and “legal meanings”. In this approach, non-governing law would just be
another kind of usage or legal meaning. However, this approach deemphasizes
several relevant differences between non-governing law, usages and governing
legal meanings.143 Therefore, it should not be preferred.
To conclude this subsection with a more general point, the fact that it is poss-
ible to connect non-governing law with more established circumstances does not
lead to the conclusion that the connected law is redundant or that it has no inde-
pendent inﬂuence on the interpretation of a contract. Non-governing law can affect
the intention of the parties. It alters the role and inﬂuence of several other circum-
stances. By emphasizing the inﬂuence of non-governing law, a court can provide a
more convincing motivation for the chosen interpretation.
G. Conclusion
The interpretation of a contract is about ascertaining the meaning of the expression
of the agreement. A court must search for the intention of the parties (section D).
This paper answers the following question: “can non-governing law inﬂuence the
interpretation of contracts?” The previous sections show that a connected non-
governing law can be one of the relevant circumstances that inﬂuence the
interpretation of a contract.
Non-governing law can be relevant in several situations (section E). First, it is
possible that the parties to the contract are connected to the non-governing law.
The connected law can provide a background that affects the way in which the
parties formulate and understand their contract. A party that is connected to the
non-governing law could understand a clause in the light of the legal consequences
that the provision would have under the connected law. A court can give effect to
the intention of the parties by interpreting the clause in accordance with the non-
governing law. Next, the contract itself can be connected to the non-governing law.
For example, the contract could contain an express reference to a non-governing
law or incorporate a non-governing rule. Such connections can show that the
parties intended the legal consequences that the contract, or a certain clause,
would have under the non-governing law.
Non-governing law can also inﬂuence the interpretation “through” other cir-
cumstances (section F). Some circumstances can show that the parties intended
an interpretation in accordance with the non-governing law. For example, the
“contract as a whole” and the “purpose of the contract” are circumstances that
can inﬂuence the interpretation of a contract. The contract as a whole can manifest
a purpose to reach the results that would follow under the non-governing law.
143See section F7 and F8.
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Moreover, the inﬂuence of non-governing law is not signiﬁcantly different
from the inﬂuence of several more established circumstances. Considering non-
governing law is not fundamentally different from considering usages and
customs. Like non-governing law, usages and customs constitute sets of rules
that provide an argument for an interpretation in accordance with these rules.
Finally, certain connections with the non-governing law, such as an express
reference, an incorporation of a non-governing rule or a choice of law clause,
suggest that the parties have put some thought into the legal consequences of
the various clauses. In contrast to a “normal” contract that is connected to the gov-
erning law, the parties voluntarily and deliberately created a connection with a
non-governing legal system. This shows that, compared with contracts without
a connection to another legal system, the argument to consider the (non-govern-
ing) legal meaning is stronger if the contract is connected to non-governing law.
Notwithstanding these arguments, the inﬂuence of non-governing law on the
interpretation of a contract is minor. It is limited to situations in which the relevant
conﬂict of laws rules do not lead to the application of the connected law or in
which the contract is connected to several jurisdictions (section C). However,
within this limited scope, the ability to consider non-governing law is a useful
tool that allows a court to better vindicate the intention of the parties.
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